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Abstract
In this paper we consider what can be computed by a user interacting with a potentially malicious
server, when the server performs polynomial-time quantum computation but the user can only
perform polynomial-time classical (i.e., non-quantum) computation. Understanding the compu-
tational power of this model, which corresponds to polynomial-time quantum computation that
can be efficiently verified classically, is a well-known open problem in quantum computing. Our
result shows that computing the order of a solvable group, which is one of the most general prob-
lems for which quantum computing exhibits an exponential speed-up with respect to classical
computing, can be realized in this model.
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1 Introduction
First-generation quantum computers will be implemented in the “cloud” style, since only
few groups, such as governments or huge companies, will be able to possess such expensive
and high-maintenance machines. In fact, IBM has recently opened their 16-qubit machine
for a cloud service [34]. In a future when many companies provide their own quantum cloud
computing services, a malicious company might emerge who is trying to palm a user off with
a wrong result forged from their fake quantum computer. In addition, even if a fortunate user
is interacting with a honest server, some noises in the server’s gate operations might change
the result. How can a user verify the correctness of the server’s quantum computation? If
the user has his/her own quantum computer, the user can of course check the server’s result,
but in this case the user may not need the cloud service in the first place. If the solution
of the problem is easily verifiable (e.g., integer factoring), the user can naturally verify the
correctness of the server’s result, but many problems considered in quantum computing are
2 Interactive Proofs for Order of Solvable Groups
not believed to have this property. Verifying classically and efficiently a server’s quantum
computation is indeed in general highly nontrivial.
It is known that if at least two servers, who are entangled but not communicating with
each other, are allowed, then any problem solvable in quantum polynomial time can be
verified by a classical polynomial-time user who exchanges classical messages with the serv-
ers [20, 24, 27]. However, the assumption that servers are not communicating with each
other is somehow unrealistic: how can the user guarantee that remote servers are not com-
municating with each other?
Whether the number of the servers can be reduced to one is a well-known open prob-
lem [4]. For certain computational problems solvable in quantum polynomial time, it is
known that this can be done. Simon’s problem [31] and factoring [30] are trivial examples,
since the answer can be directly checked in classical polynomial time. It is known that re-
cursive Fourier sampling [10], which was the first problem that separates efficient quantum
and classical computing, can be verified by a polynomial number of message exchanges with
a single quantum server [23]. Moreover, it was shown that certain promise problems related
to quantum circuits in the second level of the Fourier hierarchy [29] are verifiable by a clas-
sical polynomial-time user interacting with a single quantum server who sends only a single
message to the user [12, 26].
Our results. In this paper we consider the problem of computing the order, i.e., the number
of elements, of a finite group given as a black-box group (the concept of black-box groups
is defined in Section 2). This problem is central in computational group theory, especially
since the ability of computing the order makes possible to decide membership in subgroups.
This problem has also been the subject of several investigations in computational complexity
[1, 6, 7, 9, 32, 33]. The seminal result by Babai [6], especially, which put this problem in
the complexity class AM, has been one of the fundamental motivations behind the concept
of interactive proofs. Note that this is clearly a hard problem for classical computation: it
is easy to show that no polynomial-time classical algorithm exists in the black-box setting,
even if the input is an abelian group [9].
Most of the known quantum algorithms that achieve exponential speedups with respect to
the best known classical algorithms are for group-theoretic problems, and especially problems
over abelian groups. Shor’s algorithm for factoring [30], for instance, actually computes the
order of a cyclic black-box group. Watrous has shown that the group order problem can be
solved in quantum polynomial time when the input group is solvable [33]. Since the class
of solvable groups, defined in Section 2, is a large1 class of finite groups that includes all
abelian groups, this result significantly generalized Shor’s algorithm. Watrous’ algorithm
can actually be seen as one of the most general results achieving an exponential speedup
with respect to classical computation.
In this paper we show that the group order problem over solvable groups is also verifiable
with a single server. More formally, in Section 2, where we introduce the relevant model
of interactive protocols, we will introduce the notation IP[k, qpoly] to denote the class of
computational problems that are verifiable by a classical polynomial-time user interacting
1 It is known (see for instance [11]) that
lim
m→∞
logGs(m)
log G(m)
= 1,
where G(m) denotes the number of finite groups of order at most m and Gs(m) denotes the number of
finite solvable groups of order at most m. It is even conjectured that the quotient Gs(m)/G(m) goes
to 1 when m goes to infinity, i.e., most finite groups are solvable.
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in k messages with a server who works in quantum polynomial time. Our main result is as
follows.
◮ Theorem 1. The solvable group order problem is in the complexity class IP[3, qpoly].
Moreover, if the set of prime factors of the order is also given as input, then the solvable
group order problem is in IP[2, qpoly].
This result shows that for this important computational problem, the number of servers can
be reduced to one as well, using a small number of messages. Note that assuming, in the
second part of Theorem 1, that the set of prime factors of the order is known corresponds
to several practical situations. An important example is computing the order of p-groups2
with p known, which cannot be done in polynomial time in the classical setting [9]. The
main open question is whether the number of messages can also be reduced to 2 without
any assumption on the prime factors.
Other related works. In addition to the introduction of multiple servers mentioned above,
there are other approaches considered in the literature for constructing verification systems
for quantum computation.
First, if the user is allowed to be “slightly quantum”, any problem solvable in quantum
polynomial time can be efficiently verified with a single quantum server. For example,
Refs. [2, 14] assume that the user can generate randomly-rotated single-qubit states, and
Refs. [13, 16, 25] assume that the user can measure single-qubit states.
Second, since the class BQP (the class of decision problems that can be solved in quantum
polynomial-time) is trivially in PSPACE and PSPACE = IP [21, 28], any problem in BQP
can be classically verified using generic interactive proof protocols for PSPACE. In such
protocols, however, the server has unbounded computational power. A tempting approach
is to try to specialize these generic protocols to the class BQP, with the hope that the server’s
necessary computational power may be reduced. Ref. [3] made an significant first step in
this direction.
Finally, it has been shown very recently that assuming that the learning with errors
problem is intractable for polynomial-time quantum computation, any problem solvable in
quantum polynomial time can be efficiently verified with a single quantum server and a
single classical user [22].
2 Preliminaries
In this paper we assume that the reader is familiar with the standard notions of group theory
(we refer to, e.g., [18] for a good introduction). All the groups considered will be finite. Given
a group G, we use |G| to denote its order (i.e., the number of elements in G), and use e
to denote its identity element. Given elements g1, . . . , gr ∈ G, we denote 〈g1, . . . , gr〉 the
subgroup of G generated by g1, . . . , gr.
Black-box groups. We now describe the model of black-box groups. This concept, in
which each group element is represented by a string and each group operation is implemented
using an oracle, was first introduced by Babai and Szemerédi [9] to describe group-theoretic
algorithms in the most general way, without having to concretely specify how the elements
are represented and how groups operations are implemented. Indeed, any efficient algorithm
2 A (finite) p-group, where p is a prime, is a group of order pr for some integer r ≥ 1. A basic result
from group theory shows that any p-group is solvable.
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in the black-box group model gives rise to an efficient concrete algorithm whenever the
oracle operations can be replaced by efficient procedures. Especially, performing group
operations can be done directly on the elements in polynomial time for many natural groups,
including permutation groups and matrix groups where the group elements are represented
by permutations and matrices, respectively. In the quantum setting, black-box groups have
first been considered by Ivanyos et al. [19] and Watrous [32, 33].
A black-box group is a representation of a group G where each element of G is uniquely
encoded by a binary string of a fixed length n, which is called the encoding length. The
encoding length n is known. In order to be able to express the complexity of black-box
group algorithms in terms of the group order |G|, and not in terms of the encoding length,
we make the standard assumption that n = O(log |G|). Oracles are available to perform
group operations. More precisely, two oracles are available. A first oracle performs the group
product: given two strings representing two group elements g and h, the oracle outputs the
string representing gh. The second oracle performs inversion: given a string representing an
element g ∈ G, the oracle outputs the string representing the element g−1. Note that the
two oracles may behave arbitrarily on strings not corresponding to elements in G; this is
not a problem since our protocols will never use the oracles on such strings. We say that a
group G is input as a black-box if a set of strings representing generators {g1, . . . , gs} of G
with s = O(log |G|) is given as input and queries to the oracles can be done at cost 1.3 The
input length is thus sn = poly(log |G|).
To be able to take advantage of the power of quantum computation when dealing with
black-box groups, the oracles performing the group operations have to be able to deal with
quantum superpositions. Concretely, this is done as follows (see [19, 32, 33]). Let s : G →
{0, 1}n denote the encoding of elements as binary strings. We assume that a quantum oracle
VG is available, such that VG(|s(g)〉|s(h)〉) = |s(g)〉|s(gh)〉 for any two elements g, h ∈ G, and
behaving in an arbitrary way on other inputs (i.e., strings not in s(G)). Another quantum
oracle V ′G is also available, such that V
′
G(|s(g)〉|s(h)〉) = |s(g)〉|s(g
−1h)〉 for any g, h ∈ G and
again behaving in an arbitrary way on other inputs.
Approximate sampling in black-box groups. Babai [5] proved the following result for
general groups, which shows that elements of a black-box group can be efficiently sampled
nearly uniformly.
◮ Theorem 2. ([5]) Let G be a black-box group. For any ε > 0, there exists a classical
randomized algorithm running in time polynomial in log(|G|) and log(1/ε) that outputs an
element of G such that each g ∈ G is output with probability in range (1/|G| − ε, 1/|G|+ ε).
Solvable groups. Before discussing solvable groups, let us introduce the following concept
of polycyclic generating sequences (see [17] for details).
◮ Definition 3. Let G be a group. A polycyclic generating sequence of G is a sequence
(h1, . . . , ht) of t elements from G, for some integer t, such that:
1. 〈h1, . . . , ht〉 = G;
2. for each 1 < j ≤ t, the subgroup 〈h1, . . . , hj−1〉 is normal in 〈h1, . . . , hj〉.
There are many equivalent definitions of solvable groups in the literature (see, e.g., [17]
for a thorough discussion). In this paper we will use the following characterization: a finite
3 The assumption s = O(log |G|) is standard. Indeed, every group G has a generating set of size O(log |G|).
Additionally, a set of generators of any size can be converted efficiently into a set of generators of size
O(log |G|) by taking random products of elements [5].
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group is solvable if and only if it has a polycyclic generating sequence. This characterization,
which was already used byWatrous [33], is the most convenient for our purpose. As discussed
in [33], for any finite solvable group G given as a black box, a polycyclic generating sequence
(h1, . . . , ht) with t = O(log |G|) can be computed classically in polynomial time with high
probability using for instance the randomized algorithm by Babai et al. [8].
Watrous showed that the order of a solvable black-box group can be computed in poly-
nomial time in the quantum setting. We state this result in the following theorem.
◮ Theorem 4. ([33]) Let G be a solvable group given as a black-box group. There exists a
quantum algorithm running in time poly(log |G|) that outputs |G| with probability at least
1− 1/poly(|G|).
Let G be a solvable group and (h1, . . . , ht) be a polycyclic generating sequence of G. In
the following we will write Hj = 〈h1, . . . , hj〉 for each j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, and for convenience
write H0 = {e}. Since Hj is obtained from Hj−1 by adding one generator, the factor group
Hj/Hj−1 is cyclic. Let us write its order mj . Note that the order of G is thus the product
m1m2 · · ·mt. A fundamental (and easy to show) property of polycyclic generating sequences
is the following: For any j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, any element h ∈ Hj can be written, in a unique
way, as h = ha11 h
a2
2 · · ·h
aj
j with integers ai ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,mi − 1} for i ∈ {1, . . . , j}. We call
this sequence (a1, . . . , aj) the decomposition of h over Hj . Watrous [33] showed that the
decomposition of any element can be computed efficiently in the quantum setting, which
immediately leads to an efficient algorithm for membership testing in the subgroups Hj . We
state these two results, separately, in the following theorem.
◮ Theorem 5. ([33]) Let G be a solvable group given as a black-box group and let (h1, . . . , ht)
be a polycyclic generating sequence of G with t = O(log |G|). There exist two quantum
algorithms A1 and A2 running in time polynomial in log |G| as follows.
Algorithm A1 receives an integer j ∈ {1, . . . t} and an element h ∈ Hj, and outputs with
probability at least 1− 1/poly(|G|) the decomposition of h over Hj.
Algorithm A2 receives an integer j ∈ {1, . . . t} and an element h ∈ G, and decides whether
h ∈ Hj or not. The decision is correct with probability at least 1− 1/poly(|G|).
Interactive proofs with efficient quantum prover. Interactive proof systems are typ-
ically described as protocols for decision problems. In this paper it will be more convenient
to consider interactive proofs for computing functions, since we are interesting in computing
the order of the input group.4 The definition we give below is inspired by [15].
Let f : X → {0, 1}∗ be a function, where X is a finite set. We consider protocols
between a prover and a verifier, who both receives as input an element x ∈ X and can
exchange classical messages of polynomial length. At the end of the protocol, the verifier
outputs either some y ∈ {0, 1}∗ or one special element ⊥. We say that the function f has
a k-message polynomial-time interactive proof if there exists a k-message protocol in which
the verifier works in classical polynomial time, such that the following properties hold:
1. (completeness) there is a prover P such that the verifier’s output y satisfies y = f(x)
with probability at least 2/3 when interacting with P ;
4 In order to be completely rigorous, we should actually define this concept for functional problems
where the input is represented using oracles (since we are dealing with black-box groups where the
group operation is represented by oracles). We nevertheless omit this purely technical point in the
exposition.
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2. (soundness) for any prover P ′, the verifier’s output y satisfies y ∈ {f(x),⊥} with prob-
ability at least 2/3 when interacting with P ′.
The prover P in the completeness condition is called the honest prover.
The above definition makes no assumption on the computational powers of the provers.
Our main definition is obtained by restricting the computational power of the honest prover,
i.e., the prover P in the completeness condition.
◮ Definition 6. A function f is in the class IP[k, qpoly] if it has a k-message polynomial-time
interactive proof where the honest prover P works in quantum polynomial time.
The notation IP[k, qpoly] comes from its definition as a k-message interactive protocol with
a prover working in quantum polynomial time (when honest). We stress that in Definition
6 there is no assumption on the computational power of P ′ for the soundness.
3 2-Message Protocol with Known Prime Factors
In this section we assume that the prime factors of the order of the black-box group G
are known. We present a 2-message protocol in this case, which proves the second part of
Theorem 1.
3.1 Preliminaries
We will need the following result in our protocol.
◮ Theorem 7. Let G be a solvable group given as a black-box group. Let p1, . . . , pℓ denote
the prime factors of |G| and assume that the set S = {p1, . . . , pℓ} is also given as input.
There exists a classical algorithm running in time polynomial in log |G| that outputs elements
h1, . . . , ht ∈ G, with t = poly(log |G|), and t prime numbers r1, . . . , rt ∈ S such that, with
probability at least 1− 1/poly(|G|), the following conditions hold:
(h1, . . . , ht) is a polycyclic generating sequence of G;
the order of Hi/Hi−1 is either 1 or ri for each 1 ≤ i ≤ t, where we denote Hi =
〈h1, . . . , hi〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ t and H0 = {e}.
Before proving Theorem 7, let us discuss the main idea of the algorithm in this theorem.
The approach is to start with an arbitrary polycyclic generating sequence and refine it by
replacing each element by decreasing powers of it. Consider for instance the cyclic group
of order 12, for which we have ℓ = 2, p1 = 2, p2 = 3 and |G| = 12. Assume that we
start with the polycyclic generating sequence (k1) consisting of a unique element k1 of
order 12. We refine this sequence as (h1, h2, h3) with h1 = k
|G|/p1
1 = k
6
1 , h2 = k
|G|/p21
1 = k
3
1
and h3 = k
|G|/(p21p2)
1 = k1. This is a polycyclic generating sequence with |H1/H0| = 2,
|H2/H1| = 2 and |H3/H2| = 3. The difficulty is that naturally we do not know the order
|G|. Remember nevertheless that we know the encoding length n of the black-box group,
which is an upper bound on log2 |G|. This means that the quantity m = p
n
1 × . . .× p
n
ℓ is a
multiple of the order |G|, and thus we can use the same approach, working with m instead
of |G| when refining the original polycyclic generating sequence.
Proof of Theorem 7. Let us consider the function λ : {1, . . . , ℓ}×{1, . . . , n} → Z such that
λ(i, a) = pn−ai × p
n
i+1 × · · · × p
n
ℓ
for any (i, a) ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} × {1, . . . , n}. Now consider the sequence
(λ(1, 1), . . . , λ(1, n), λ(2, 1), . . . , λ(2, n), . . . , λ(ℓ, 1), . . . , λ(ℓ, n)) (1)
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consisting of ℓn integers (the integers in the sequence are strictly decreasing). Define the
function µ : {1, . . . , ℓn} → Z such that µ(j) is the j-th integer in Sequence (1). Note that
µ(j − 1)/µ(j) ∈ S for any j ∈ {2, . . . , ℓn}.
We now describe our algorithm that computes the claimed generating sequence.
We first compute a polycyclic generating sequence (k1, . . . , kt′) of G with t′ = O(log |G|)
using the randomized polynomial-time algorithm from [8], already mentioned in Section 2,
which succeeds with probability at least 1− 1/poly(|G|). Let us write Ki′ = 〈k1, . . . , ki′〉 for
each 1 ≤ i′ ≤ t′, and K0 = {e}.
We now show how to refine the polycyclic generating sequence. For each i′ ∈ {1, . . . , t′},
we replace ki′ by the sequence of ℓn elements (k
µ(1)
i′ , . . . k
µ(ℓn)
i′ ), which gives a new sequence(
k
µ(1)
1 , . . . , k
µ(ℓn)
1 , k
µ(1)
2 , . . . , k
µ(ℓn)
2 , . . . , k
µ(1)
t′ , . . . , k
µ(ℓn)
t′
)
, (2)
of ℓnt′ elements. Sequence (2) is a polycyclic generating sequence of G since (k1, . . . , kt′) is
a polycyclic generating sequence of G and µ(ℓn) = 1. For any i′ ∈ {1, . . . , t′}, observe that
∣∣∣〈kµ(1)1 , . . . , kµ(j)i′ 〉/〈kµ(1)1 , . . . , kµ(j−1)i′ 〉
∣∣∣ ∈ {1, µ(j − 1)/µ(j)} (3)
for any j ∈ {2, . . . ℓn}. Similarly for any i′ ∈ {2, . . . t′} we have
∣∣∣〈kµ(1)1 , . . . , kµ(1)i′ 〉/〈kµ(1)1 , . . . , kµ(ℓn)i′−1 〉
∣∣∣ ∈ {1, p1}. (4)
Let us rename the elements of Sequence (2) as h1, . . . , ht, with t = ℓnt′. Note that
t = O(ℓ(log |G|)2) = O((log |G|)3). Let us write Hi = 〈h1, . . . , hi〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ t and
K0 = {e}. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ t, the order of Hi/Hi−1 is either 1 or ri, where ri can be
determined from Equations (3) and (4). More concretely, ri is of the form µ(j − 1)/µ(j)
for some j (which can be immediately computed from i) when Hi/Hi−1 corresponds to the
case of Equation (3), and ri = p1 when Hi/Hi−1 corresponds to the case of Equation (4).
Note that in both cases we have ri ∈ S, from the property µ(j − 1)/µ(j) ∈ S mentioned
before. ◭
3.2 The protocol
Let S = {p1, . . . , pℓ} denote the set of prime factors of |G|, which is given as an additional
input. The protocol is given in Figure 1. The main idea is that the verifier can, using The-
orem 7, compute by itself a polycyclic generating sequence (h1, . . . , ht) and prime numbers
r1, . . . , rt such that |Hi/Hi−1| ∈ {1, ri} for each 1 ≤ i ≤ t. This is done at Step 1 of the
protocol. Note that |G| =
∏t
i=1 |Hi/Hi−1|. The purpose of Steps 2-5 is to decide whether
|Hi/Hi−1| = 1 or |Hi/Hi−1| = ri, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, by interacting with the prover.
More precisely, the verifier interacts with the prover to test, for each i, whether hi ∈ Hi−1
or hi /∈ Hi−1. This requires testing non-membership in a solvable group with a polynomial-
time quantum prover, which is achieved by sending (at Step 3) to the prover the element
hsii xi for a random bit si and a random element xi, and asking the prover to find the chosen
bit si. These tests enable the verifier to decide which of the two cases holds (at Steps 5.1
and 5.2), and then to compute |G| at Step 6, or to detect cheating (at Step 5.3).
3.3 Analysis of the protocol
We now analyze the protocol of Figure 1. Let h1, . . . , ht be the group elements and r1, . . . , rt ∈
S be the prime numbers computed at Step 1. The analysis below is done under the assump-
tion that (h1, . . . , ht) is a polycyclic generating sequence of G and |Hi/Hi−1| ∈ {1, ri} for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, which is true with probability at least 1− 1/poly(|G|) from Theorem 7.
8 Interactive Proofs for Order of Solvable Groups
Input: • a black-box solvable group G with generators {g1, . . . , gs}
• the set S = {p1, . . . , pℓ} of prime factors of |G|
1. The verifier uses the algorithm of Theorem 7 to compute elements h1, . . . , ht and
prime numbers r1, . . . , rt ∈ S. Let us write Hi = 〈h1, . . . , hi〉 for each 1 ≤ i ≤ t
and H0 = {e}.
2. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, the verifier takes a bit si ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random
and takes a random element xi ∈ Hi−1 using the algorithm of Theorem 2 with
ε = 1/22n (where n represents the encoding length of the black-box group).
3. The verifier sends to the prover the elements h1, . . . , ht and, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , t},
the element hsii xi.
4. The prover sends to the verifier bits b1, . . . , bt and integers ai,j for i ∈ {1, . . . t}
and j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}.
5. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , t} the verifier does the following:
5.1 If hi = h
ai,1
1 · · ·h
ai,i−1
i−1 then set ℓi = 1;
5.2 If hi 6= h
ai,1
1 · · ·h
ai,i−1
i−1 and bi = si then set ℓi = ri;
5.3 If neither of these two conditions holds, then abort the protocol and output ⊥.
6. The verifier outputs the product of the ℓi’s.
Figure 1 Our 2-message protocol computing the order of a solvable group when the prime factors
of the order are known.
Let us first consider the correctness, i.e., showing that there exists a prover (working in
quantum polynomial time) who makes the verifier able to compute |G| with high probability.
This prover acts as follows. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, the prover checks if the element hsii xi
received at Step 3 is in the subgroup Hi−1, using Algorithm A2 of Theorem 5. If the prover
learns that this element is in Hi−1 then the prover applies Algorithm A1 of Theorem 5 to
obtain a decomposition (ai,1, . . . , ai,i−1) of hi over Hi−1, and sends to the verifier the bit
bi = 0 and these values ai,1, . . . , ai,i−1. If the prover learns that this element is not in Hi−1,
then the prover sends to the verifier the bit bi = 1 and arbitrary values ai,1, . . . , ai,i−1.
Let us analyze the verifier’s output when interacting with the above prover. If |Hi/Hi−1| =
1 then we have hi ∈ Hi−1 and thus h
si
i xi ∈ Hi−1 whatever the value of si is. With probability
at least 1−1/poly(|G|), the prover’s message is thus bi = 0 and ai,1, . . . , ai,i−1 corresponding
to the decomposition of hi over Hi−1, and then the verifier sets ℓi = 1. If |Hi/Hi−1| = ri
then we have hi /∈ Hi−1 and thus h
si
i xi ∈ Hi−1 if and only if si = 0. With probability at
least 1 − 1/poly(|G|), the bit bi sent by the prover satisfies bi = si, and thus the verifier
sets ℓi = ri (since the second part of the message ai,1, . . . , ai,i−1 cannot correspond to the
decomposition of hi over Hi−1). In conclusion, with probability at least 1− 1/poly(|G|) the
output at Step 6 is
t∏
i=1
ℓi =
t∏
i=1
|Hi/Hi−1| = |G|.
Let us now consider the soundness, i.e., showing that for any prover the verifier outputs
either |G| or ⊥ with high probability. It is clear that if |Hi/Hi−1| = ri, then the prover
cannot convince the verifier to set ℓi = 1, since there is no set of integers ai,1, . . . , ai,i−1
such that hi = h
ai,1
1 · · ·h
ai,i−1
i−1 . On the other hand, if |Hi/Hi−1| = 1 then the prover cannot
convince the verifier to set ℓi = ri unless the prover is able to decide whether si = 0 or
si = 1 from the element h
si
i xi received, which cannot be done with probability larger than
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1
2 +
1
2δ, where
δ =
1
2
∑
h∈Hi−1
∣∣∣∣Prxi [xi = h]− Prxi [hixi = h]
∣∣∣∣
represents the variational distance between the two probability distributions xi and hixi
(seen as distributions over Hi−1). We have
δ ≤
1
2
∑
h∈Hi−1
∣∣∣∣Pr[xi = h]−
1
|Hi−1|
∣∣∣∣+
1
2
∑
h∈Hi−1
∣∣∣∣Pr[hixi = h]−
1
|Hi−1|
∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
h∈Hi−1
∣∣∣∣Pr[xi = h]−
1
|Hi−1|
∣∣∣∣+
1
2
∑
h∈Hi−1
∣∣∣∣Pr[xi = h−1i h]−
1
|Hi−1|
∣∣∣∣
=
∑
h∈Hi−1
∣∣∣∣Pr[xi = h]−
1
|Hi−1|
∣∣∣∣
≤ |Hi−1|ε
≤ 1/2n,
where the second inequality follows from Theorem 2 and the third inequality follows from
our choice of ε and the upper bound |G| ≤ 2n. Thus, for any fixed i such that |Hi/Hi−1| = 1,
the prover cannot convince the verifier to set ℓi = ri with probability greater than 12+
1
2n+1 =
1/2+1/poly(|G|). Let us now bound the probability that the verifier’s output is either |G| or
⊥. This corresponds to the probability that the verifier does not output an integer different
from the order of G. Note that the verifier can output an integer not equal to the order only
if the prover forces the verifier to set ℓi 6= |Hi/Hi−1| for at least one index i. From the above
analysis, we know that this can happen with probability at most 1/2+1/poly(|G|), i.e., such
a cheating is detected by the verifier at Step 5.3 with probability at least 1/2− 1/poly(|G|),
in which case the verifier immediately aborts the protocol and outputs ⊥. Thus the overall
probability that the verifier’s output is either |G| or ⊥ is at least 1/2− 1/poly(|G|). Note
finally that this probability can be amplified to reach the soundness threshold of 2/3 used
in Definition 6 by repeating the protocol of Figure 1 a constant number of times in parallel
and deciding the output based on a standard threshold argument.
4 General 3-Message Protocol
In this section we show that when the prime factors of the order of G are not known, we
can design a 3-message protocol, which proves the first part of Theorem 1.
4.1 The protocol
Our 3-message protocol, described in Figure 2, is obtained by modifying the protocol of the
previous section. More precisely, Step 1 in the protocol of the previous section is replaced
by two steps (Steps 0 and 1 in Figure 2): instead of having the verifier compute a polycyclic
generating sequence (h1, . . . , ht) using Theorem 7, which requires the knowledge of the set
of factors of |G|, in the new protocol the prover computes by itself this sequence and sends
it at Step 0 to the verifier, who then checks that the sequence is really correct at Step 1. All
the other steps 2-6 are exactly the same as for the protocol in Figure 1 (one small exception
is Step 3, which is slightly rewritten since the polycyclic generating sequence does not need
to be sent to the prover anymore).
10 Interactive Proofs for Order of Solvable Groups
Input: a black-box solvable group G with generators {g1, . . . , gs}
0. The prover sends to the verifier the following:
a. a list of t elements h1, . . . , ht ∈ G, for some t = poly(log |G|);5
b. a list of t prime numbers r1, . . . , rt;
c. a list of integers αi,j , for i ∈ {1, . . . , s} and j ∈ {1, . . . , t};
d. a list of integers βi,j , for i ∈ {2, . . . , t} and j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1};
e. a list of integers γi,j,ℓ, for i ∈ {2, . . . , t} and j, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}.
Let us write Hi = 〈h1, . . . , hi〉 for each 1 ≤ i ≤ t and H0 = {e}.
1. The verifier checks that the following equalities hold:
a. gi = h
αi,1
1 · · ·h
αi,t
t for all i ∈ {1, . . . , s};
b. hrii = h
βi,1
1 · · ·h
βi,i−1
i−1 for all i ∈ {2, . . . , t} and h
r1
1 = e;
c. hihℓh
−1
i = h
γi,1,ℓ
1 · · ·h
γi,i−1,ℓ
i−1 for all i ∈ {2, . . . , t} and all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}.
If any of these equalities fails, then the verifier aborts the protocol and outputs ⊥.
2. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, the verifier takes a bit si ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random
and takes a random element xi ∈ Hi−1 using the algorithm of Theorem 2 with
ε = 1/22n.
3. The verifier sends, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, the element hsii xi.
4. The prover sends to the verifier bits b1, . . . , bt and integers ai,j for i ∈ {1, . . . t}
and j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}.
5. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , t} the verifier does the following:
5.1 If hi = h
ai,1
1 · · ·h
ai,i−1
i−1 then set ℓi = 1;
5.2 If hi 6= h
ai,1
1 · · ·h
ai,i−1
i−1 and bi = si then set ℓi = ri;
5.3 If neither of these two conditions holds, then abort the protocol and output ⊥.
6. The verifier outputs the product of the ℓi’s.
Figure 2 Our 3-message protocol computing the order of a solvable group.
4.2 Analysis of the protocol
Let us consider the correctness. In that case the prover first uses the algorithm of Theorem 4
to compute the order |G|, then factorizes it using Shor’s algorithm [30] and collects the prime
factors in a set S. The prover then uses the algorithm of Theorem 7 using the set S as input
to obtain group elements h1, . . . , ht and a list of integers r1, . . . , rt ∈ S such that with
probability at least 1− 1/poly(|G|) the following two conditions hold:
(i) (h1, . . . , ht) is a polycyclic generating sequence of G, with t = poly(log |G|),
(ii) the order of Hi/Hi−1 is either 1 or ri for each 1 ≤ i ≤ t,
where as usual we use the notationHi = 〈h1, . . . , hi〉 for any i ∈ {1, . . . , t} and the convention
H0 = {e}. These two conditions are equivalent to the following:
5 Naturally, this is binary strings corresponding to the elements h1, . . . , ht (i.e., the oracle representations
of these elements) that are actually sent, not the elements themselves. Note also that, to simplify the
exposition, we are assuming that these strings do correspond to elements of G. To deal with a cheating
prover that may send strings not corresponding to group elements, we can simply ask the prover to
send a certificate of membership in G for each string (such a certificate can be computed in quantum
polynomial time using the algorithms of Theorem 5).
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(a) Ht = G, i.e., gi ∈ Ht for each i ∈ {1, . . . , s};
(b) hrii ∈ Hi−1 for each i ∈ {1, . . . , t};
(c) Hi−1 is normal in Hi for any i ∈ {2, . . . , t}, i.e., hihℓh−1i ∈ Hi−1 for any ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , i−1}.
Thus, with probability at least 1 − 1/poly(|G|), the prover can compute the following de-
compositions in quantum polynomial time using Algorithm A1 of Theorem 5:
a decomposition (αi,1, . . . , αi,t) of gi over Ht, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , s};
a decomposition (βi,1, . . . , βi,i−1) of h
ri
i over Hi−1, for each i ∈ {2, . . . , t};
a decomposition (γi,1,ℓ, . . . , γi,i−1,ℓ) of hihℓh−1i over Hi−1, for each i ∈ {2, . . . , t} and
each ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}.
At Step 0, the prover sends all these integers, along with the elements h1, . . . , ht and the
primes r1, . . . , rt. All the tests performed by the verifier at Step 1 then pass. The analysis
of the second part of the protocol (Steps 2-6) is then exactly the same as the analysis of the
protocol of Section 3.
The soundness follows by observing that passing the tests performed by the verifier at
Step 1 guarantees that Conditions (a)-(c) of the previous paragraph hold. This guarantees
that Conditions (i)-(ii) hold as well, and thus the soundness analysis for the second part of
the protocol (Steps 2-6) is exactly the same as the analysis of the protocol of Section 3.
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